 |
 |
 |
 |
Full Position on the War in Iraq
Index
1. Introduction
2. On-going costs of the war for Iraq and the United States.
3. Should the US wait until Iraqi forces are able to "do the job"?
4. Are US forces needed to prevent greater violence and civil war?
5. Withdrawal does not mean "cut and run"
6. What does a phased withdrawal look like?
7. Need for international involvement
We advocate fundamental changes in U.S. policy in Iraq that will bring our troops home safely and quick AND promote the creation of a sovereign and peaceful Iraq.
It is past time to face the reality that the American military occupation of Iraq is part of the problem, not the solution. Our forces are a continuing incitement to nationalist insurgency and regional anti-Americanism. We are locked in a battle against an insurgency that can be continually replenished and will fight to the end to get the United States out of its country. For every insurgent killed, three take his place. Our occupation provides a common cause that unites the disparate elements of the insurgency. It engenders hostility and resentment among the general population, which creates a tolerant base of support for the insurgency without which it couldn’t function. It attracts foreign jihadists and money like a powerful magnet. Lastly, it compromises the legitimacy and effectiveness of the Iraqi government and security forces.
What is the right thing to do? It is a truism that there are no longer any good options in Iraq. The wisest course for the U.S. is to promptly initiate a phased withdrawal of troops and unequivocally declare it has no intentions of maintaining a long-term military presence. The Administration should announce a plan to end the occupation that includes target dates for troop withdrawal as well as how it will meet economic and military objectives. To serve both U.S. and Iraq’s best interests, the U.S. must transform its military occupation into an Iraqi-led, regionally backed, and internationally supported effort to achieve stability and a representative government. A phased, total troop withdrawal in the near term is an essential first step.
On-going costs of the war for Iraq and the United States
Many tens of thousands of Iraqi civilians have lost their lives in the crossfire. The lack of security has brought reconstruction of most of this devastated country to a near standstill. By all accounts, life in Iraq since the invasion is one of deepening misery. A recent study from the United Nations Development Program and the Iraqi Ministry of Planning found that the Iraqi people are suffering widespread death and war-related injury, high rates of infant and child mortality, chronic malnutrition, and significant setbacks for women. The economy remains stagnant, many cities in ruins, and basic services still erratic or non-existent. According to the State Department, Baghdad homes this summer had electricity on average for nine to 11 hours a day; in other cities, the figure drops to an average of eight hours. Crime and violence are so pervasive that it is hazardous for Iraqis to venture from home, let alone revive the country’s economic life or address the gathering health crises. The American military is not able to turn this situation around. Instead, its offensive operations in areas controlled by insurgents leave yet more destruction, displacement, misery and hostility in their wake.
For Americans, the human and financial costs of the military occupation have grossly exceeded the Bush Administration’s projections, and are increasingly hard to bear. Nearly 2,000 U.S. servicemembers have lost their lives, over 14,000 others have been wounded. Morale and performance are jeopardized as enlisted troops have seen their tours of duty repeatedly extended and members of the National Guard and Reserves have been inappropriately burdened. To date, Congress has appropriated over $200 billion for Iraq operations. The Administration is expected to request yet another “supplemental” appropriation in January of many tens of billions to support an on-going monthly cost (or “burn-rate”) of approximately $5 billion. In light of the large costs of caring for the victims of Hurricane Katrina and rebuilding damaged areas, the weak U.S. economy can’t sustain this level of spending without grave consequences.
Should the US wait until Iraqi forces are able to "do the job"?
In response to public calls for an end to the war, the Administration says that American servicemen and women will leave when they can be replaced by Iraqi security forces. Unfortunately, this is an “exit strategy” akin to Waiting for Godot. The U.S. has a $5.7 billion program to train and equip Iraqi forces. But from the start the new army has been beset by problems ranging from hasty recruiting, insufficient training and equipment, a weak command structure, poor discipline and moral. There’s been improvement in some of these areas, according to several objective reports. But more fundamental problems remain.
According to a declassified Pentagon report from June, only a “small number” of Iraqi forces are capable of fighting the insurgency on their own – three of 107 battalions are judged to be capable of full and independent operation. Much of the problem results from the fact that most of the Iraqi forces, working under and supposedly along-side the American military, oppose the U.S. and its objectives. Desertions are widespread and mutinies are not uncommon. At the same time, the Iraqi police and National Guard are unable to provide security because their association with the U.S. fatally compromises them. The daily and grisly death toll of Iraqi security forces reveals the futility of the American strategy in Iraq. To the extent that the new Iraqi security forces are seen as “replacements” for U.S. soldiers – exactly the Pentagon’s strategy for bringing down U.S. troop levels – they will be seen as U.S. stooges and high priority targets of the insurgency. Moreover, these forces are furthering the tensions leading to civil war. The army is dominated by Shiites and Kurds, in a proportion even higher than the 80 percent those groups represent in the population. And the Iraqi units sent to the worst hot spots are the most capable ones, and by definition, they are dominated by recruits from sectarian militias deeply hostile to Sunni Arabs.
Only by ending the U.S. occupation can the Iraq army, policy, border patrol, law enforcement officers emerge as necessary and trusted elements of a sovereign country, rather than reluctant accomplices of an unwelcome occupation and distrusted national government. Assistance with training and equipment from NATO, other international bodies, along with the U.S., will be necessary.
Are US forces needed to prevent greater violence and civil war?
Despite the widespread acknowledgement that the U.S. is stuck in a quagmire, many people, including many who strongly opposed the war, believe we have a responsibility to stay until some minimal level of security for the Iraqi people has been reestablished and the country’s infrastructure is at least partially rebuilt and functioning. More pointedly, many people have expressed the concern that if the U.S. withdraws its troops, greater violence and chaos will follow, perhaps leading to civil war. The reality is that the frightening spectre of civil war hovers over Iraq, whether we “stay the course” as proposed by the Administration or if we leave. Sectarian conflict will only be resolved – or sufficiently managed – through agreements reached in the political arena. The U.S. occupation exacerbates sectarian violence by attracting foreign Jihadists, particularly militant Islamists, who forge alliances with Iraqi Sunni nationalists to fight against the Shiite and Kurd-dominated government
Some who oppose any target dates for leaving Iraq say that it will simply tell the insurgents how long they have to hold out until they will have a free hand. The flaw in this logic is that it allows no possibility of an exit unless the insurgency is completely defeated. And that means there is no end in sight. In fact, deadlines force actions, as we have seen repeatedly in post-Saddam Iraq. Setting target dates will compel the Iraqi government and dissident factions to reach agreements for peaceful power-sharing between the various groups in Iraq and invest more in creating an independent, effective security force. It will encourage the U.S. and neighboring countries to engage in critical diplomacy and step up actions to ensure regional stability. It may also prompt other countries to contribute forces to an international stabilization force.
We do not suggest the U.S. walk away from the ongoing conflict and security problems. The U.S. will need to continue some military operations during a transition period. These might include patrolling no-flight zones, border surveillance, training for Iraqi security forces, intelligence collection and maintenance of a regional peace keeping or quick-reaction force. These functions could require a sizable contingent of U.S. forces and would be best if U.S. forces operated with other international forces, perhaps under an international command. In any case, they would no longer be part of an occupying army whose mission was to battle the insurgency, but part of a peacekeeping/stabilization force whose mission was to protect the population.
Withdrawal does not mean "cut and run"
The U.S. assumed daunting moral and legal obligations by invading and occupying a sovereign country. Tremendous financial and technical assistance is necessary to help rebuild this shattered country. In addition to funds already allocated or planned, some portion of the cost of U.S. military operations should be redirected to support Iraqi directed reconstruction and humanitarian needs. More urgently, the U.S. must overhaul its economic aid effort, which is widely viewed as incompetent and ineffective. Nor surprisingly, the U.S. military has proven to be poorly suited to the task of reconstruction and nation building. Too much money has been spent on U.S.-conceived efforts that pour billions into the coffers of U.S. contractors, but achieve little else. Far too little money is actually spent in Iraq and far too much on overhead and security. This spending has not created jobs of significant investment activity.
What would a phased withdrawal look like?
We advocate a phased withdrawal of all U.S. troops, to be completed in months not years, along with modified military operations and deployments. Troops should be redeployed to less visible and less provocative places and their operational priority should be to protect civilians, not to destroy insurgents. Thus, the military should limit operations that endanger civilians, and should modify procedures governing arrests, treatment and prisoners and home searches.
Need for international involvement
A violent, “failed state” and terrorist haven in Iraq is in no one’s interest. Many other states, including close U.S. allies, have refused or sharply limited their involvement in Iraq because they do not want to endorse or participate in a failed American war. In the changed context of an American withdrawal, one can expect greater international willingness to commit resources, including peacekeepers and trainers. Iraq’s neighbors have much at stake in Iraq’s development. International unity is needed to ensure that neighboring states do not intervene in Iraq and help prevent smuggling and terrorist infiltration across borders. International assistance with reconstruction, humanitarian needs and economic aid, all of which are already on the international agenda, clearly remain critically important. The sooner the U.S. takes steps to end its military occupation, the more constructive its reconstruction and political initiatives will be and the greater the likelihood that nascent Iraqi leaders and other international actors can also act constructively to promote Iraqi security and sovereignty.
September 21, 2005
|
|
|
|
